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Abstract
Cloud computing is an emerging, revenue generating and internet based technology, where computing power,
storage and other resources are provided to the stakeholders in a single package. The traditional online banking
systems can make use of the cloud framework for providing economical and high-speed online service to the
consumers. This paper first describes a systematic Multi-factor bio-metric Fingerprint Authentication (MFA) approach
which provides a high-secure identity verification process for validating the legitimacy of the remote users. The
significance of this approach is that the authentication credentials of the users are not revealed to the bank and
cloud authentication servers, but allows the servers to perform remote users’ authentication. We then extend this
investigated framework to develop a privacy protection gateway for obscuring and desensitizing the customers’
account details using tokenization and data anonymization techniques. This approach retains the original format of
data fields at various levels of the database management systems and makes the data worthless to others except
the owner. In addition to designing an efficient MFA, through extensive experimental results we illustrate our
privacy protection gateway is practical and effective.
Keywords: Public cloud, Online banking, Fingerprint biometrics, Tokenization, Data security and privacy
Introduction
Banks provide the impetus for people and country to
develop economically. They make financial dealing easy,
safe and convenient. Banks take part in welfare activities
and also help in social causes of the people. Most of the
banks provide the financial dealings through passbooks,
ATM, mobile banking, electronic banking and telephone
banking. Among these financial dealings, e-banking and
mobile banking will be more convenient and these two
are essential for busy people. Specifically, it is critical
to provide an efficient, reliable and secure e-banking
service to the consumers because user needs and cyber-
attacks are increasing on the internet-based technolo-
gies. The cloud environment is more suitable paradigm
to new, small and medium scale banking organizations
as it eliminates the requirement [23] for them to start
with small resources and increase gradually as the ser-
vice demand rises.
One of the most advanced technology today is cloud
computing, which provides expert’s solutions, computing
and storage resources as outsourcing on the pay-per-use
basis at nominal cost. In India, Pondicherry Co-operative
Urban Bank Ltd, Nawanagar Cooperative Bank Ltd, which
is in Gujarat and Sree Charan Souharda Cooperative Bank
Ltd, located in Bangalore are currently using IBM Smart
Cloud and HDFC retail banking moved to Oracle Private
Cloud (i.e., Oracle Enterprise Manager 12c). Bank of
America and Merrill lynch also moved to IBM cloud
banking services. Microsoft organisation has spent billions
of dollars for providing cloud services and they have tie-
up with TEMENOS organisation to offer core banking
services to the stakeholders [25]. TATA Consultancy
Services (TCS) reported that cloud computing is the
next generation banking technology with innovative
business models [26].
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The transformation of the banks into cloud computing
has following advantages:
 Can provide optimised, virtualized and scalable
operational environments.
 Banks can overcome present and future challenges.
 High speed bandwidth can be provided to access
online banking services in milliseconds.
 Banking services can cover geographically with
effective multi-channels integration.
 Banks can be more attractive for providing new
offerings.
 Revenue gain for new, small and medium scale
banking.
 High cost of running in-house data centres can be
eliminated.
 Can provide flexible platforms to build and bring
advanced banking services to public.
The problems and risks
Today banking organizations are operating with high
competitions, bank brand names, and regulated envi-
ronments. Therefore, the aspects of core banking ser-
vices are influenced by business considerations and
compliance requirements. Innovations done so far in
bank technologies, operations and security controls
have been managed inside the enterprises. Since, the
public cloud based functionalities and security control
aspects are managed out of the banking enterprises.
These out of boundary aspects have highly influenced
on the bank adoption and sometimes this adoption may
damage brand name and existence. Data security and
privacy concerns prevent the banking stakeholders to
migrate to the cloud-based platforms. As part of the
threats landscape within public cloud, the online bank-
ing services need to be protected from the cloud ser-
vice provider and other malicious attackers.
The following are the biggest and legitimate problems
associated with public cloud solutions:
1) Making sure that user access keys and credentials
are secured. Access credentials and keys for the
cloud-based infrastructure that rented out from
some public cloud vendors need to be appropriately
managed and protected. Four major attacks
envisioned in our proposed authentication
process, they are:
i. Malicious insiders of the cloud and bank cannot
learn the remote user credential parameters.
ii. User login and authentication credentials are not
revealed to the cloud and bank servers.
iii. An attacker may eavesdrop on the credential
communication channel and he/she may use
replay attack.
iv. Sometimes, an attacker may change the network
IP of the authorized user so that the request
coming from that altered system appears to be a
request coming from an impersonated user.
2) Similarly, dependency on geographic or legal
jurisdiction that becomes another added point to
consider, because certain laws in certain political
jurisdictions may allow certain local agencies to
access to the data that is hosted within their
territory. For instance, the patriot law in the United
States allows certain US agencies to demand access
to the data which is stored in the US Union
Territory. Banking information systems are sensitive
to this kind of situation. So, there is a need to take
appropriate measures to make sure that banking
information still remains private regardless of
whether it is hosted in any territory or not.
3) In the similar manner, multi-tenancy, where multiple
consumers are hosted in a shared public cloud
infrastructure for instance. There are chances that
they may interfere with each other by some manner.
From the banking organizations perspective several
risks are associated with public cloud solutions. Some of
the key risks are summarized below.
i. Complexity in banking governance, compliance and
audit management
ii. Dilution in bank functional, operational and
technology control aspects can lead impact on
reputation, regulatory and business.
iii. Difficulties in sustaining security standards, regional
privacy laws and information acts.
iv. Banking services will be locked in cloud and it is
difficult to bring back in-house if required.
v. Potentially cloud API’s are lacking in portability, so
stakeholders cannot move from one cloud service
provider to another.
Our contribution
The following are the major contribution of our
research.
1) Multi-factor Authentication: The multi-factors like
user ID and password, biometric fingerprint and
random strings are used as key parameters in
authentication process. Here, user ID and password
show what user knows, fingerprint biometric represents
who the user is, and random strings are used for
verifying the user’s identity to servers, server’s
identity to the user and servers identity to other
servers. Our proposed MFA provides a convenient
and high-secure multi-stage identity verification
process using random strings.
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2) Strong privacy preservation of user credentials: In
our proposed authentication scheme, user
credentials are not stored in cloud servers but allow
the servers to perform authentication on hashed
credentials. Moreover, the cloud service providers
itself is corrupted still cannot learn the user
credentials.
3) Authorization protocol: We propose an
authorization protocol which provides data access
tokens for each authenticated user to access the
account details from the public cloud servers.
4) Strong Data Privacy: Data protection issues like data
privacy, residency and compliance laws are achieved
by using various tokenization techniques and privacy
preservation mechanisms.
5) Provable Security: Our proposed multi-factor
biometric fingerprint authentication and protection
gateway mechanisms provide true protection for the
user credentials and sensitive account details in a
public cloud. Therefore the problems and risks
associated with public cloud can be eliminated.
This paper is further divided into seven sections. Intro-
duction provides the background information required to
understand the present and future problems associated
with in-house online banking systems. The overview of
our trusted framework is summarized in Motivation.
Our trusted framework describes the authentication,
authorization and privacy protection mechanisms.
Completeness of our proposed authentication protocol
analysis is described in Our protection mechanisms.
Completeness of authentication protocol reports the
experimental study of our proposed schemes. Litera-
ture reviews associated with our research work are
presented in Experimental evaluation. Related work
summarizes the proposed methodologies and future
directions.
Motivation
In this section we provide the essential information
required to understand present and future problems as-
sociated with in-house online banking systems. Figure 1
represents the statistical information of top 5 countries
internet usage by July 2014. Because of the arrival of
new mobile internet technologies and other broad-band
internet technologies [30] internet users are increasing
gradually. The projected global internet users of top five
countries by 2011 and 2015 are reported in Fig. 2. With
this growth, we can say that internet is becoming daily
utility to all groups of people and most of them are
using online banking services for fund transfer, e-bills
payment, e-shopping and other facilities listed in [5, 20].
In recent years, efforts are being made to develop e-
banking for e-commerce sectors. In [1, 2] authors are
reporting that e-banking users are growing exponentially
in recent years. In china, e-banking usage has increased
in trillion yuan from 2008 to 2015. Globally 47 % of
customers are willing to use e-banking for their daily
needs [23]. Globally 1 in 4 internet users access online
banking sites [34]. The e-banking has various advantages
for both consumer and banks as given in Table 1. In [20],
author Jagdeep Singh describe various e-banking advan-
tages to the government, nation, merchants and others.
Customer’s point of view high level security, advanced
features and user friendly technologies are the main
considerations. Providing these requirements is highly
expensive. Many IT projects have been failed in the
banking sectors due to lack of understanding user’s
requirements and technology illiteracy. Hence there is a
tremendous demand for outsourcing core banking in many
Fig. 1 World top 5 countries’ global internet users
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countries. Banking organizations should be advanced in
technology adoption to grow up their business services
profitably.
Attacks on online banking
The online banking system has tremendous benefits as
listed in Table 1, even then why everyone is not using it?
The reason is that online banking services could be sub-
jected to the cyber criminals. In [3, 4], authors describe
various cyber-attacks that are taking place on different
components of online banking, example Spy-Eye malware.
Most popular attacks on e-banking are phishing and
pharming. These two attacks steal the user login confiden-
tial. In [6–10], authors describe various possible solutions
to the phishing, Distributed Denial-of-Service, man-in-the
browser and cross-site attacks, none of which are suitable
for cloud-based environment. LeBlanc.D [15] present
various risks associated with e-banking functionalities.
PetrHanaeek et al. [24] present a comparative study on e-
banking authentications and their attacks.
Security in online banking
Authentication is the primary and fundamental oper-
ation for many applications, systems and technologies.
Till now the traditional authentication with passwords
and PIN has dominated the world computing. Present
ICT is server-based and it requires stronger authentica-
tion methods to provide well enhanced online services.
Because of this reason, password and PIN authentication
is nearing to the end of their life cycle in many applica-
tions. Most of the banks provide user-id, password and
also one time password for securing online access to the
financial accounts. This type of authentication process is
not at all securable because passwords can be obtained
by dictionary attack or from specific site information
and prior studies as described in [11–14]. Large number
of methods and tools are available to compromise pass-
words. Among which, some of the tools are listed in
Table 2 and in [16–18] authors described some other
passwords hacking techniques and tools. Traditional au-
thentication is not at all secure for e-banking. So, banks
in countries like the USA, Japan, China and other listed
in [19] have moved to the biometrics security systems.
Specifically, banks in countries like USA and Estonia are
using fingerprint biometric security.
Fig. 2 The projected global internet user’s of the world top five countries by 2015
Table 1 E-banking benefits
To bank To customer
Per unit operation cost is saved
up to 90 %
Transparency and Flexibility




Higher cross-selling opportunities Time saving
Helps gain customers prompt
feedback on products and services
Transactions can be performed at
24 × 7 days with lowest charging
rates
Can gain discount benefits from
online purchases
Table 2 The password hacking tools
Password hacking tools Links





Cain and Abel www.oxid.net
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Fingerprint biometrics
Biometric fingerprint authentication is the next innovation
in banking organizations for providing secure online bank-
ing services. Fingerprint security systems are used in
broad range of applications for verifying user’s identity.
Some of the applications are time and attendance system,
ATM, PC, laptop and mobile authentication, Aadhaar
cards and voter registration. Key advantages of fingerprint
security systems are more convenience, highly secure and
provides accountability. Seyyede Samine Hosseini et al.
[19] conducted a survey on different biometric authentica-
tion systems and they found out that more than 47 % of
banks are using fingerprint security in their financial deal-
ings. Specifically in Asia 52 % of banking organization are
using fingerprint security systems. Because of bio-metric
fingerprint accuracy, reliability, scalability, convenience,
cost and stability, it is universally accepted for banks in
any operational environments [21].
Our trusted framework
In public cloud, protecting user credentials and account
details from the cloud service provider and other mali-
cious users is a challenging task. As a result we have in-
vestigated a generic trusted framework for protecting
user credentials and online banking data in the public
cloud. The major components we proposed as a part of
trusted framework are fingerprint-based authentication
protocol, authorization protocol for validating access
rights and protection gateway for preserving data secur-
ity and privacy in public cloud. We consider that the
user authentication credentials, authorization rights and
look-up tables are stored and maintained with highly se-
cured in-house databases or trustee databases as shown
in Fig. 3.
A consumer who wants to avail the online banking
services needs to register at the bank before making any
transactions. Along with account details, consumer has
to submit his/her personal identification details such as
permanent address proof, mobile number and most im-
portantly a fingerprint for registration. In this process, a
new idea is proposed where the user can select a user-id
(UID) and password. We put a restriction that the pass-
word must contain at least one digit, one control charac-
ter, uppercase and lowercase letters and one punctuation
symbol is quite strong. In our implementation of this
registration phase, we have followed the proper rules
and regulations to create, lockout and reset passwords as
described in [31–33, 37].
In registration phase, a random secrete key is generated
and it is combined with the user biometric fingerprint
Fig. 3 Proposed model for securing online banking services in the Cloud
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data using exclusive OR operation. The secrete key is also
encrypted using user’s biometric fingerprint data. User-id,
hashed password, encoded fingerprint data and encrypted
secrete key values are stored in the highly secured data-
base. In login phase, Bank Authentication Server (BAS)
verifies the user input password matching status, if it is
true then it sends the encrypted secrete key to the user
registered mobile number through SMS for encoding user
input biometric fingerprint data. In this process, user de-
crypts secrete key using his/her biometric fingerprint data
and then they encode their fingerprint data for authentica-
tion. In authentication phase, BAS and user sends hashed
encoded fingerprint data to the Cloud Authentication
Server (CAS) for authentication. CAS checks the hashed
password and performs the matching. Our investigated
fingerprint-based authentication process is briefly illus-
trated in Fig. 4.
To describe our authentication approach, we introduce
some important terminologies. We denote the registered
password as PWD, biometric fingerprint data as B and the
user input password as PWD* and biometric fingerprint
data as B*. We also indicate the registered hashed password
as h(PWD) and hashed encoded biometric fingerprint data
as BB. User input hashed password is denoted as h(PWD*)
and hashed fingerprint data is indicated as BB*. Further we
use Δ as a matching algorithm for checking correctness of
the biometric data, and the function δk is used with secrete
key k for encoding biometric fingerprint data using exclu-
sive OR operation. The function δk cannot be computation-
ally reversible without k and will not affect on Δ matching
results. The user and bank authentication server send
{h(PWD*), h(δk(B*))}, {h(PWD), h(δk(B))} respectively to
CAS for verification. CAS checks the h(PWD*) = h(PWD)
and matches Δ (BB, BB*) = (h(δk(B)), h(δk(B*))) without
storing matching log records locally. Thus, CAS cannot
learn the user password and fingerprint data.
After successful verification of the status of the
user password and fingerprint data matching, Bank
Authorization Server (BARS) sends OTP to the
Authorized User (AU) through SMS and user access
rights and OTP to the Cloud Authorization Server
(CARS). AU also sends received OPT and transaction
details to CARS. CARS checks OTP sent by AU and
BARS. If OPT and access rights are matched, then
CARS instructs Cloud Application Server (CAPS) to
perform the user transaction. At the end, CAPS and
protection gateway carry out following actions:
i. Cloud application server performs the transaction
and immediately sends the resultant transaction
details to the protection gateway server without
storing any data locally.
ii. The transaction values are adjusted in a tokenization
database using tokenization knowledge associated
with account number and balance.
iii. The protection gateway sends the updated obscured
data values to CAPS.
iv. CAPS stores the obscured data elements rather than
real. The obscured values will be used for most of
the transactions.
If the authorized user requires the original data, then
he/she has to request to the protection gateway. The real
data is never stored in any of the cloud databases includ-
ing log records. Protection gateway highly restricts the
access of original data in most of the cases. In this way
protection gateway limits the potential exposure to the
malicious users.
Fig. 4 Proposed verification model for multi-factor authentication
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Our protection mechanisms
In this section, we describe in detail functionalities of
our protection mechanisms. These mechanisms enable
the banking organizations to maintain their own control
over the customer sensitive data in public cloud.
Authentication protocol
We present a MFA protocol, in which user’s hashed
password and fingerprint data verification will be per-
formed using following three phases.
Initialization phase, bank and cloud authentication
servers prepare the pair of access keys for remote user
authentication. BAS prepares a public key indicated as
baspbk and a private key denoted as basprk. CAS also
prepares the public and private key pairs as caspbk, and
casprk,. Both the servers keep their private keys as
secrete and supplies their public keys to end users.
In registration phase, user registers with bank as follow.
1) A user U who wants to avail the banking online
services must produce a valid personal identity and
mobile number at the bank. Next, the user needs to
select a user-id (UID) and password and also need to
pick a random secrete key ‘k’. User fingerprint will
be captured and then client registration module
computes h(PWD), BB = h(δk(B)) = h(k⊕ B), and
EB(k), where h(.) is a one-way hash function and
EB(.) is symmetric encryption function.
2) Client registration module sends UID, h(PWD), BB,
and EB(k)) credentials to BAS through highly secure
SSL channel.
3) BAS stores all these details and their status in a
highly secured database as depicted in Table 3,
where status denotes whether the credentials are
registered and unrevoked or not. In our scenario we
consider that each server will keep their private keys
and all other severs ID and public keys for
communicating other servers.
4) BAS sends registration details and status to the user
through highly secure SSL channel.
The login and authentication phase takes ten steps for
validating correctness of the end user identity as shown in
Fig. 5 and described as below. Here, we used five random
strings named as u, v, w, x, and y for encrypting authenti-
cation data.
1) User inputs UID and PWD*, and then client module
computes C0 ¼ Ecaspbk h PWDð Þ Ebaspbk UIDð Þ
 u 
using CAS and BAS public keys caspbk and Baspbk
respectively, where C0 is a cipher text and u is a
random string. User then sends C0 to CAS.
2) CAS decrypts C0 using its private key casprk and then
obtains h PWDð Þ; Ebasp
bk
UIDð Þ and u. Temporarily it
keeps h(PWD*) and ue used for later purpose, and then





BAS public key baspbk and sends C1 to BAS.
3) BAS obtains CASID and Ebaspbk UIDð Þ by decrypting
C1 using basprk and then decrypts UID using same
private key. BAS checks CASID to ensure that C1
has come from the proper cloud authentication
server and then checks UID value in the credential
database, if found and valid, then derives C2 ¼
Ecaspbk BASID h PWDð Þk kvð Þ using CAS public key
and sends C2 to CAS.
4) CAS decrypts C2 using its private key casprk and
obtains BASID, h(PWD) and v and then checks
h(PWD*) = h(PWD). If both the passwords are
equivalent, then CAS computes C3 = ev(pwd
status‖w) where pwd status is the user password
verification status. CAS sends C3 to the bank
authentication server.
5) CAS also derives C4 = eu(CASID‖w) and sends C4
to the user.
6) If the password checking status is true, then BAS
will send Encrypted Secrete Key (ESK) i.e., εB(k) to
the user mobile through SMS.
7) BAS computes C5 = Ew(BB‖x) and sends to CAS.
8) User retrieves the secret key k by decrypting εB(k)
using his/her biometric fingerprint data B* as k =
A(εB(k), B*), where A(.) is an extracting function
corresponding to εB(.). The user then computes
BB* = h(δk(B*)) = h(k⊕ B*) and derives C6 =
ew(BB *‖y) and sends C6 to CAS.
9) Finally, cloud authentication server performs the
matching function on C5 and C6 i.e., Δ (BB,
BB*) = (h(δk(B)), h(δk(B
*)) and checks the
matching score whether it is greater than or
equal to a predefined threshold. If it is true, then
CAS considers the user request legitimate. Next,
CAS sends fingerprint matched status and the
available cloud authorization server ID (CARSID)
to BAS as C7 = Ex(fingerprint status‖CARSID).
10) CAS also derives C8 = Ey(CARSID) and sends to the
user.
The logically related steps of the login and authentica-
tion phase are given in Algorithm 1.
Table 3 The online banking customer credentials
UID h(PWD) BB EB(k) Status
UID1 h(PWD1) BB1 EB(k1) Valid/Invalid
UID2 h(PWD2) BB2 EB(k2) Valid/Invalid
…. …. …. …. ….
UIDi h(PWDi) BBi EB(ki) Valid/Invalid
…. …. …. …. ….
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Finally in this phase, bank authentication server
decrypts C7 as dx (C7) using its random string x and
obtains fingerprint status and the available cloud
authorization server ID. If the fingerprint status is true,
then BAS will supply CARSID to the BARS for further
communication. The user also decrypts C8 as dy (C8)
using his/her random string y and obtains the CARSID
for further data processing.
Authorization and transaction management protocol
In this sub-section, we describe an authorization and
transaction management protocol which provides the
session key and data access tokens for each authorized
user. As described in the sub-section 4.1, if a user is le-
gitimate, then the Bank Authorization Server (BARS)
will generate a unique random number referred as one-
time transaction password or session key and access to-
kens for performing a specific transaction. In [41], we
propose an enhanced symmetric RBAC which we used
for enforcing access policies and managing legitimate
users’ authorizations.
The control flow of our proposed authorization and
transaction management protocol is depicted in Fig. 6
and described below:
1) Bank authorization server sends OTP to the user
registered mobile number through SMS.
2) BARS then computes the cipher text using CARS
public key as C0 ¼ Ecarspbk OTP access tokensk kBAPSIDð Þ
where OTP is the session key, access tokens
represents the obscured account number, user
permissions and fund access constraints. BAPSID is
the bank application server ID. Bank authorization
server sends C0 to CARS.
3) AU derives C1 ¼ Ecarspbk OTPð ktransactiondetailsÞ
and sends C1 to CARS, where transaction details
indicates the information regarding fund transfer,
paying utility bills, mobile recharge, etc.
4) Cloud authorization server decrypts C0 and C1 using
its private key carsprk and then checks OPT’s, if both
are same, then the user is allowed to perform some
transaction. Cloud Application Server (CAPS)
performs the data operations using access tokens and
immediately sends the resultant values to Bank
Application Server (BAPS) without storing any type
of data on local virtual machine as C2 ¼ Ebapspbk
transaction resultsjjCAPSIDð Þ.
5) Cloud application server also sends the transaction
status to AU.
6) BAPS decrypts C2 using its private key bapsprk, then
the transaction values will be mapped to the real
data elements and adjusted in highly secured look-up
database using tokenization knowledge associated
with a specific account number and balance. After
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that BAPS returns the updated obscured data
tokens to the cloud application server. CAPS
stores the obscured data rather than real sensitive
data. The obscured data will be used for most of
the transactions. In this protocol, BARS and BAPS
are the part of the protection gateway.
Achieving privacy using data anonymization gateway
In this sub-section, we describe the protection gateway
using tokenization techniques. Our proposed gateway is
more suitable and effective for preserving privacy of the
numerical sensitive attributes than any other privacy
methods. In this gateway we use advanced tokenization
Fig. 6 Authorization and transaction management protocol
Fig. 5 Login and authentication protocol
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techniques for obscuring bank account details. We used
t-closeness mechanism properties for adding more de-
identification to the tokenized data values. Data security
and privacy concerns can be eliminated successfully by
using our proposed protection gateway. Banking organi-
zation’s can make use of this protection gateway for
preserving data security and privacy in public cloud,
while it still allows the authorized users to perform use-
ful transactions.
k-Anonymity
The k-anonymity is a popular data de-identification priv-
acy mechanism created by L. Sweeney [41] for data pub-
lishing. The main consideration of this scheme is that
for every record there should be k-1 other record has to
be exist such that all these records quasi-attribute values
should be equal. So, that each and every record is de-
identifiable from k-1 other records. For example, con-
sider the three attributes date of birth, street and city in
a record. The record is k-anonymized when other k-1 re-
cords have the same date of birth, street and city values.
In general, more data privacy can be achieved when we
take higher value for k. As given in Table 4, k-anonymity
divides the record attributes into three categories and
assigns appropriate properties and required actions need
to be taken.
Figure 7 (i) shows sample bank customer records
where an attribute’s pin-code, age and gender are con-
sidered as quasi-identifiers (QI) and account balance
consider as sensitive attribute. An attribute is consid-
ered to be sensitive when its value in a database should
not allow adversary to disclose. The attribute is called
quasi-identifiers when it is not considered as sensitive.
Figure 7(ii) depicts three 4-anonymity customer data-
sets derived from the Fig. 7(i). Here, ‘*’ indicates sup-
pressed data values, for example pin-code = 4758*
means pin-code is in the range of [47580–47589] and
the age = 4* means that the age is in between [40–49].
Note that there are 4 records which have the same
QI values in the Fig. 7(ii) that is why this table is in
4-anonymity. A k-anonymity scheme guarantees that
each user record cannot be disclosed from other users’
record in a dataset of size k. The fictitious tuples would be
included in the database if there are no k identical QI. The
effect of fictitious records will be removed on the
processing.
l-Diversity
Ashwin M et al. [43] proposed l-diversity scheme which
enhances the concept of k-anonymity. The k-anonymity
approach cannot resist the homogeneity and back-
ground knowledge attacks. In cloud-based applications
these two attacks are possible. So, more powerful data
de-identification mechanisms are required for achieving
adequate data privacy in the public cloud. The use of l-
diversity will address the weaknesses of k-anonymity. By
using l-diversity, we can achieve more data anonymiza-
tion. The main difference between these two approaches
is that in k-anonymity, k number of records must have
the same values for QI and in l-diversity; each quasi-
identifiers dataset must have at least l different sensitive
values. Figure 7(iii) preserves 3-diversity for the data
given in Fig. 7(ii). While l-diversity provides a guarantee
of the stronger privacy than k-anonymity, the adequate
l-diversity may not be achieved with natural occurrence
of the sensitive values. The fictitious data records need
to be added to the given datasets to increase occur-
rences for preserving l-diversity and also need to com-
pensate the effects of these record values when
performing some useful computations. Also, in this
scheme there is a chance of occurrence of probabilistic
inferences.
t-Closeness
In [44], a t-closeness approach was described, which
provides the further enhancement over the l-diversity. In
this scheme, the authors have taken a specific measure-
ment called t-closeness which uses a characteristic that
the distance of the sensitive values distribution in the
original datasets and generalized datasets must be within
threshold t. Hence, these two distributions distance can
be measured in earth mover distance metric. This ap-
proach is more suitable and effective for preserving priv-
acy of the numerical sensitive attributes than any other
privacy methods. Because of this advantage we use this
scheme in our proposed gateway.
The above schemes’ characteristics are developed in our
proposed protection gateway to add more anonymization
to the online banking account details. Various data obfus-
cation techniques are available for the above privacy
mechanisms to replace the values of QI. These techniques
are basically categorized as generalization and permuta-
tion based data anonymization. The generalization based
Table 4 K-anonymity attributes
Attribute type Example Action need to be performed Property
Sensitive A/c Balance, PIN Can be de-linked from individual user Key piece of data that users considers to be sensitive
about revealing
Key Name, Phone No., SSN Obscure or Removed Can be derived individual identity directly
Quasi-Identifiers Gender, Birthday, Pin code Generalize or Suppress Attributes used to link with external information for
identifying individuals
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techniques are used to replace the values of QI with the
suppressed values as shown in the above k-anonymity ex-
amples. Although generalization works effectively and the
association privacy and presence privacy are eliminated,
but it has considerable data loss [45]. To address this data
loss problem, the permutation based data anonymization
techniques have come in existence. The permutation
based techniques decompose the sensitive and QI values
into two different tables without data suppression and
keeps the QI values table in the published area. Although
permutation techniques achieve better performance over
the generalization based techniques, it cannot resist the
presence privacy, because where the exact values of QI are
placed in the published environment that enables pres-
ence leakage. None of these data anonymization tech-
niques are suitable for achieving desired privacy in the
cloud-based environment.
Tokenization
In [35, 36], reported that the tokenization is the best ap-
proach for protecting sensitive information in the public
cloud environment compared to encryption and any
other security mechanisms. Tokenization replaces the
sensitive data elements with tokens or surrogate values
and also maps back to the real data by making use of a
secure enclave or look-up table’s. Tokenized data cannot
be mathematically reversible because the tokens do not
have logical relationship with the original data. Typically,
for performing computations on the tokens in various
cloud applications, tokenization allows to maintain same
data type and length for the tokens as like original data.
Tokenization process makes the confidential data useless
to anyone except the owner of the data. So, the online
banking application can make use of the advantages of
tokenization for obscuring customer account details.
The obscured data values can be stored in public cloud
by following t-closeness characteristics, so that the inside
and outside malicious users cannot disclose the key
pieces of data fields. The anonymized data values can be
processed in public cloud servers without bothering
about malicious users. Later, the computation results
can be mapped to the real data elements in the enter-
prise tokenization database. Table 5 presents the obfus-
cation techniques for data tokenization.
Example
Table 6 shows two customers account records and are
obscured as follow.
 Names are mapped to a new unique values using
permutation.
 Prefix preservation retains the birth year on date of
birth.
 Maps the street and city data field values to a new
single value
 Phone numbers are shortened by truncating end
values retains only area code.
 Replaces the confidential part of the account
number with a character ‘x’.
 Account balance values are added to a fixed offset
using shift.
In this way, the customer account details will be
obscured for protecting individual’s sensitive data fields.
Figure 8 shows a theoretical example that helps to
understand the secure computing in the public cloud
using data anonymization. The objective of this example
is to transfer some fund from one account to another,
without exposing original account number and balance.
Here, the confidential parts of each account number
such as branch code and product code is replaced with a
character ‘x’ and balance is added to a fixed offset i.e.,
10,000. Also, some fictitious data records are added to
the obscured data.
Look-up database or secure enclave holds the anon-
ymized data values and their associated original values.
This database is typically secured on the enterprise/trustee
network at highly restricted area. Using anonymized data
Fig. 7 Data anonymization of bank customer records (i) original data (ii) 4-anonymity (iii) 3-diversity
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values, the fund transfer transaction will be performed in
the public cloud without exposing original data values.
After successful transaction, the resultant values can be
correlated to the real data elements using tokenization
knowledge associated with account number and balance. A
true fund transfer value can be protected as long as the
tokenization knowledge remains confidential. Thus the on-
line banking data can be protected in public cloud.
Completeness of authentication protocol
In this section we analyze the completeness of our
proposed authentication protocol using belief logic.
Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN) logic [59] is the
fundamental and popular belief logic which is widely used
to analyse the completeness of various authentication
schemes, but this logic has some shortcomings [60]. Gong,
Needham, and Yahalom (GNY) logic [61] is the extended
version of the BAN logic. We used GNY logic [61] to
analyze our multi-factor authentication protocol. First, we
describe important terminologies that we use in our belief
logic and we re-describe our approach according to the
GNY logic. Next, we analyze our goals and finally we re-
port assumptions list.
Basic terminologies and statements
In this section we defined key terminologies which we
used for analyzing our proposed with GNY logic. Let
CPi and CPj are the two credential parameters and we
introduce the following rationale based on CPi and CPj:
 (CPi, CPj): conjunction of two rationales CPi
and CPj.
 CPi*: CPi is a credential parameter sent by user in
login and authentication phase.
Table 5 Tokenization techniques for obscuring bank customers data records
Techniques Description Customer
name





Alice 17.12.1973 Side hill Downtown 0418-444-4467 6207693489 $5000
Bob 24.09.1990 North Brooklyn 0418-444-6423 3001337388 $10000
Permutation - Maps each data field value to a
distinct new value.
- Using secure enclave we can
translate new value to original value.
Eva 17.12.1973 Side hill Downtown 0418-444-4467 6207693489 $5000
Rob 24.09.1990 North Brooklyn 0418-444-6423 3001337388 $10000
Customer name data field values mapped to a distinct new values.
Prefix-Preserving - Retains the birth year on date of
birth or Replace with a dummy date.
- Useful for preserving date field format.
Alice 07.02.1973 Side hill Downtown 0418-444-4467 6207693489 $5000
Bob 14.04.1990 North Brooklyn 0418-444-6423 3001337388 $10000
The birth year will be preserved, but the date of birth is scrambled.
Hashing - Maps different data field values to a
new single value.
- Useful for translating large amount
data values to a new value.
Alice 17.12.1973 8704274623 0418-444-4467 6207693489 $5000
Bob 24.09.1990 7909231657 0418-444-6423 3001337388 $10000
Each customer street and city is mapped to a unique new value.
Truncation (or)
Non-disclosure
- Data field values to be shortened by
truncating end values.
- Useful for tokenizing fields.
Alice 17.12.1973 Side hill Downtown 0418 6207693489 $5000
Bob 24.09.1990 North Brooklyn 0418 3001337388 $10000
The phone number is shortened, but still preserves the customer location.
Hiding - Replaces sensitive value with a
character (typically x) or constant
value ‘0’.
- Useful for preventing sensitive
data fields.
Alice 17.12.1973 Side hill Downtown 0418-444-4467 xxxxxx3489 $5000
Bob 24.09.1990 North Brooklyn 0418-444-6423 xxxxxx7388 $10000
Except last four digits of an account number, all other digits will be substituted with a
character ‘x’.
Shift - A data field value is added to a fixed
offset.
- Useful for obscuring data field, while
allowing authorized users to perform
computation in cloud.
Alice 17.12.1973 Side hill Downtown 0418-444-4467 6207693489 $15000
Bob 24.09.1990 North Brooklyn 0418-444-6423 3001337388 $20000
A fixed offset $10000 is added to the account balance values.
Table 6 An example of tokenized bank customer accounts
Customer name Date of birth Street City Phone number Account number Account balance
Eva 07.02.1973 8704274623 0418 xxxxxx3489 $15000
Rob 14.04.1990 7909231657 0418 xxxxxx7388 $20000
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 h(CPi): one way hashing function on CPi.
 {CPi}+k, {CPi}-k: asymmetric encryption and
decryption of CPi using a public key + k and a
private key -k.
 {CPi}k, {CPi}−1k : symmetric encryption and decryption
of CPi using a key k.
In our proposed belief logic, following are the state-
ments which we describe the properties of above ration-
ale. Let Ei and Ej are the two entities which participate
in the login and authentication approach.
 Ei⊲ Ej: Ej is informed Ei
 Ei∋ CPi: Ei has a credential parameter CPi
 Ei ~CPi: Ei conveyed CPi
 Ei≡ #(CPi): Ei persuaded that CPi is generated from
proper entity
 Ei≡Φ (CPi): Ei feels that CPi is acceptable
 Ei≡ Ei↔S Ej : Ei persuaded that S is a proper secrete
for Ei and Ej
 Ei≡ →þK Ej : Ei trusts that’s + K is a proper public key
for Ej
 Ei = > CPi: Ei has authorization over CPi
 Ei⊲ *Ej: Ej informed to Ei that he has not sent any
messages in present session
Protocol transformation
Below we map our proposed authentication method-
ology into Ei→ Ej: CPi form. We also convert some ter-
minologies of our protocol to satisfy the GNY belief
logic. Here, the user is denoted as C, cloud authentica-
tion server is indicated as S1 and bank authentication
server is represented as S2.
1) C→ S1:{{h(PWD*), {UID}K2, u}K1}
2) S1→ S2:{{CASID}K2, {UID}K2}
3) S2→ S1:{{BASID, h(PWD), v}K1}
4) S1→ S2:{{pwd status, w}v}
5) S1→ C:{{CASID, w}u}
6) S2→ C:{ESK}
7) S2→ S1:{{BB, x}w}
8) C→ S1:{{BB*, y}w}
9) S1→ S2:{{fingerprint status, CARSID}x}
10) S1→C:{{CARSID}y}
In the above transformation K1 and K2 are CAS
and BAS public keys respectively and u, v, x and y
considered as random strings. Here, the client input
UID, PWD* and BB* we regard same as BAS database
details.
We then converted our protocol into Ei| ~ CPi and Ei
⊲ Ejas given below. Here, if the rationale CPi and its
terms are appears first time either in Ei| ~ CPi or Ei
⊲ Ej then those rationale and terms will be preceded
with the star. Our authentication protocol transform-
ation productions are described as follow:









iii. S1⊲  BASID; h PWDð Þ; vf gK1f g∼ > S2j≡S2↔v S1
iv. S2⊲  pwd status;  wf gvf g∼ > S1j≡S1←w S2
v. C⊲  CASID; wf guf g∼ > S1j≡S1↔w C
vi. C⊲ ESKf g∼ > S2j≡S2
vii. S1⊲  BB;  xf gwf g∼ > S2j≡S2↔x S1
viii. S1⊲  BB;  yf gwf gg∼ > Cj≡ C ↔y S1
ix. S2⊲  fingerprint status;  CARSIDf gxf g∼ > S1j≡S1↔x S2
x. C⊲  CARSIDf gy
 
∼ > S1j≡S1↔y C
Goals
The goals of our proposed belief logic are categorized
into four aspects as follow:
1) Message content authentication
Fig. 8 Secure computing in the public cloud using
data anonymization
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In first flow, S1 feels and believes that the client
request is valid and recognizable




In second flow, S2 feels and believes that the S1
request is valid and recognizable
S2j≡Φ CASIDf gK2; UIDf gK2
 
:
In third flow, S1 feels and believes that the S2 response
is valid and recognizable
S1j≡Φ BASID; h PWDð Þ; vf gK1
 
:
In fourth flow, S2 feels and believes that the S1
response is valid and recognizable
S2j≡Φ pwd status; wf gv
 
:
In fifth flow, C feels and believes that the S1 response
is valid and recognizable
Cj≡Φ CASID; wf gu
 
:
In sixth flow, C feels and believes that the S2 message
is valid and recognizable
Cj≡Φ ESKf g:
In seventh flow, S1 feels and believes that the S2
response is valid and recognizable
S1j≡Φ BB; xf gw
 
:
In eighth flow, S1 feels and believes that the C
response is valid and recognizable
S1j≡Φ BB; yf gw
 
:
In ninth flow, S2 feels and believes that the S1 response
is valid and recognizable
S2j≡Φ fingerprint status; CARSIDf gx
 
:
In tenth flow, C feels and believes that the S1 response




2) Message origin authentication
In first flow, S1 believes C originated request




In second flow, S2 believes S1 originated message
S2≡S1j∼ CASIDf gK2; UIDf gK2
 
:
In third flow, S1 believes S2 sent response
S1≡S2j∼ BASID; h PWDð Þ; vf gK1
 
:
In fourth flow, S2 believes S1 conveyed message
S2≡S1j∼ pwd status; wf gv
 
:
In fifth flow, C believes that S1 sent the response
C≡S1j∼ CASID; wf gu
 
:
In sixth flow, C believes S2 originated encrypted se-
crete key
C≡S2j∼ ESKf g:
In seventh flow, S1 believes S2 sent response
S1≡S2j∼ BB; xf gw
 
In eighth flow, S1 believes C conveyed response
S1≡Cj∼ BB; yf gw
 
:
In ninth flow, S2 believes S1 sent response




In tenth flow, C believes S1 conveyed response
C≡S1j∼ CARSIDf g:
3) Credentials Verification and Validation
In third flow, S2 believes and verifies S1 sent UID, if it
found and valid, then S2 sends C’s hashed password to S1,
otherwise user authentication process will be terminated.
S2j≡S1∋ UIDf g:
In fourth flow, S1 believes and verifies C and S2 sent
hashed passwords, if passwords are matched, then S1
sends response to the C and S2, otherwise authentication
process will be terminated.
S1j≡C; S2∋ h PWDð Þ; h PWDð Þf g:
In ninth flow, S1 believes and validates C and S2 sent
hashed fingerprints data using biometric matching func-
tions, if fingerprints are matched, then S1 sends response
to the C and S2, otherwise authentication process will be
terminated.
S1j≡C; S2∋ h δk Bð Þð Þ; h δk Bð Þð Þf g:
4) Generation of Session keys
C and S1 believes that u is a one-time session key
shared between C and S1
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Cj≡S1≡C↔u S1:
S2 and S1 believes that v is a one-time session key
shared between S2 and S1
S2j≡S1≡S2↔v S1:
S1 and S2 believes that w is a one-time session key
shared between S1 and S2
S1j≡S2≡S1↔w S2:
S1 and C believes that w is a one-time session key
shared between C and S1
S1j≡C≡S1↔w C:
S2 and S1 believes that x is a one-time session key
shared between S2 and S1
S2j≡S1≡S2↔x S1:
C and S1 believes that y is a one-time session key
shared between C and S3
Cj≡S1≡C↔y S1:
Assumption list
To analyze our authentication protocol using belief logic
we made the following list of assumptions:
 S1 has public key + K, private key –K and a one-time
random string w S1∋þ K; S1∋–K; S1∋w
 S1 prepared one-time random string w for encrypt-
ing session credential details. So that we assume C
and S2 believes w is shared more securely
S1j≡S1↔w C; S2f g:
 Since w is generated by S1 in our authentication
approach, so that S1 has w and persuaded that w is
fresh, and also assumes that w is used by C and S2
for encrypting session credential details
S1∋w; S1≡# wð Þ:
 C prepared one-time random strings u and x for
encrypting session details. We assume that S1
believes u and x are shared more securely between
C and S1Cj≡C1↔u; x S1:
 Since the one-time random strings u and x are pre-
pared by C, so that C has u and x, and persuaded
that u and x are fresh, and also assumes that u and
x are used by S1 for encrypting session credential
details C∋ u; xð Þ;C≡# u; xð Þ:
 S2 has a public key + K1, private key –K1 and a one-
time random strings v and y
S2∋þ K1; S2∋–K1; S2∋ v; yf g:
 S2 has prepared one-time random strings v and y for
encrypting authentication credentials. We assume
that S1 believes v and y are shared more securely
between S2 and S1S2j≡S2↔v; y S1:
 Since the one-time random strings v and y are pre-
pared by S2, so that S2 has v and y, and persuaded
that v and y are fresh, and also assumes that v and y
are used by S1 for encrypting session credential
details S2∋ v; yð Þ; S2≡# v; yð Þ:
Logic analysis
By using GNY belief logic we analyzed our authentication
protocol and we can also prove that our proposed meth-
odology achieves our objectives. Below we described the
logical postulates adoption of our proposed protocol to
achieve its objectives, where we taken T3 and T4 logical
postulates from the GNY logic [61].
1) The first flow:




; S1∋−K; C∋u; C≡# uð Þ
S1⊲ h PWDð Þ; UIDf gK1;u
n o T4ð Þ:
If S1 is informed by the client C that the message
{h(PWD*), {UID}K1, u}+K is encrypted with S1 public key +
K, then S1 obtains {h(PWD*), {UID}K1, u} using corre-
sponding private key –K. From the received message, S1
decrypted contents are formulated as
S1j≡ÞΦ h PWDð Þ; UIDf gK1;u
 
; S1∋−K
S1j≡ÞΦ h PWDð Þ; UIDf gK1;u
n o
þK
n o R1;R2ð Þ:
If S1 private key –K is matched for decryption, then S1
accepts the client request and believes that the client’s
h(PWD*), {UID}K1 and u are recognizable and considers
for further authentication process. Therefore, we can
understand that S1 believes client request and it can be
formulated as follow
S1j≡ÞΦ h PWDð Þ; UIDf gK1;u
  þK ; S1∋þ K
S1 ≡Φ h PWDð Þ; UIDf gK1; u
 		 R1; R3ð Þ:
2) The second flow:
S2⊲ CASIDf gK1 UIDf gK1
 
S2∋−K1
S2⊲ CASID; UIDf g T4ð Þ:
If S2 is informed by the CAS server S1 that the mes-
sage {{CASID}K1, {UID}K1} is encrypted with S2 public
key + K1, then S2 obtains message contents CASID and
UID using corresponding private key –K1. From the re-
ceived message, S2 decrypted contents are formulated as
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S2j≡ÞΦ CASID; UIDð Þ; S2∋−K1
S2 ≡Φ CASIDf gK1; UIDf gK1
 		 R1; R2ð Þ:
If S2 feels UID is recognizable, found and valid, then
S2 entitled to believes that the rationale parameters
CASID, UID are fresh and generates one-time random
string v for further communication
S2j≡ΦÞ CASID; IDð Þ; S2∋−K1; S2∋v; S2≡# vð Þ
S2 ≡# CASIDf gK1; UIDf gK1
 		 F1; F7ð Þ:
Therefore, S2 strongly believes that the credential pa-
rameters received in the second flow are fresh
S2⊲ CASIDf gK1; UIDf gK1
 
; S2∋−K1; S2j≡ΦÞ CASID; UIDf gð Þ
S2 ≡∼ CASIDf gK1; UIDf gK1
 		 I1ð Þ:
Below given conditions are holds: 1) S2 receives the ra-
tionale {{CASID}K1, {UID}K1} that is encrypted with pub-
lic key + K1; 2) S2 believes that all the decrypted
credential components are recognizable 3) S2 entitled to
trust that S1 sent message is fresh. Therefore, S2 verifies
CASID and UID, if verification is successful, then S2 be-
lieves that the client and S1 are legitimated entities.
Therefore, we can understand that S2 trusts C and S1
and continues communication.
According to the proposed belief logic, S2 believes that
the server S1 is honest. We assumes S2| ≡ S1= > S1| ≡ *
and we form the following logical postulates for further
adoption
S2j≡ÞS1 ¼> S1j≡Þ; S2j≡Þ CASIDf gK1; UIDf gK1
 
; S2j≡S1Þ∼
CASIDf gK1; UIDf gK1
 
; S2∋−K1
S2j≡S1j≡S2Þ↔K1 S1Þ J2ð Þ:
3) The third flow:
S1⊲ BASID; h PWDð Þ; vf gþK
 
; S1∋−K; S2∋v; S2≡# vð Þ
S1⊲ BASID; h PWDð Þ; vf g T3ð Þ:
If S1 is informed by S2 that the message {BASID,
h(PWD), v}+K is encrypted with S1 public key + K, then
S1 obtains {BASID, h(PWD), v} using corresponding pri-
vate key –K. From the received message, S1 decrypted
contents are formulated as
S1j≡ΦÞ BASID; h PWDð Þ; vð Þ; S1∋−K
S1 ≡Φ BASID; h PWDð Þ; vf gþK
 		 R1; R2ð Þ:
Below given conditions are holds: 1) S1 receives the ra-
tionale {BASID, h(PWD), v}+K that is encrypted with
public key + K; 2) S1 believes that all the decrypted cre-
dential components are recognizable 3) S1 decrypts the
rationale {BASID, h(PWD), v}+K using private key -K; 4)
S1 trusts that v is fresh one-time random string and used
for further communication with S2; 5) S1 entitled to trust
that S2 sent message is fresh. Then, S1 validates the
hashed passwords received from C and S2, if matched,
and then S1 believes that the client is legitimate entity.
Therefore, we can understand that S1 trusts the client
C and continues authentication process. According to
the proposed belief logic, S1 believes that the server S2 is
honest. We assumes S1| ≡ S2= > S2| ≡ * and we form the
following logical postulates for further adoption
S1j≡S2Þ ¼> S2j≡; ÞS1j≡# BASID;h PWDð Þ;vf gþK
 
;
S1j≡S2∼ BASID;h PWDð Þ;vf gþK
 
; S1∋‐KÞ
S1≡S2 ≡S1↔v S2j J2ð Þ
4) The fourth flow:
S2⊲ pwd statu; wf gv
 
S2∋v
S2⊲ CASID; UIDf g T4ð Þ:
If S2 is informed by the CAS server S1 that the message
{pwd status, w}v is encrypted with one-time random string
v, then S2 obtains {pwd status, w} using v. From the
received message, S2 decrypted contents are formulated as
S2j≡ÞΦ pwd status; wð Þ; S2∋v
S2 ≡Φ pwd status; wf gv
 		 R1; R2ð Þ:
If S2 feels pwd status is recognizable and true, then S2
entitled to believes that the rationale parameters pwd
status and w are fresh and also it generates one-time
random string y
S2j≡ΦÞ pwd status; wð Þ; S2∋v; S2∋w; S2≡# wð Þ
S2 ≡ pwd status; wf gv
 		 F1; F7ð Þ:
Therefore, S2 strongly believes that the parameters re-
ceived from S1 are fresh
S2⊲  pwd status; wf gv
 
; S1; S2∋v; S2j≡Φ pwd status; wf gð ÞÞ
S2 ≡S1∼ pwd status; wf gv
 		 I1ð Þ:
Below given conditions are holds: 1) S2 receives the ra-
tionale {pwd status, w}v that is encrypted with one-time
random string v; 2) S2 believes that all the decrypted cre-
dential components are recognizable 3) S2 entitled to
trust that S1 sent message is fresh. Then after, S2 verifies
pwd status if it is true, then it believes that the client is
legitimated entity. Therefore, we can understand that S2
trusts C and continues authentication communication.
According to the proposed belief logic, S2 believes that
the server S1 is honest. We assumes S2| ≡ S1= > S1| ≡ *
and we form the following logical postulates for further
adoption
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S2j≡ÞS1 ¼> S1j≡; ÞS2j≡# pwd status; wf gv
 
;
S2j≡ÞS1∼ pwd status; wf gv
 
; S1; S2∋v
S2≡S1 ≡S2↔v S1j J2ð Þ:
5) The fifth flow:
C⊲ CASID; wf gu
 
;C; S1∋u
C⊲ CASID; wf g T3ð Þ:
If the client C is informed by S1 that the message
{CASID, w} is encrypted with CAS and C shared random
string u, then C obtains {CASID, w} using u. From the re-
ceived message, C decrypted contents are formulated as
Cj≡ΦÞ CASID; wð Þ; C; S1∋u
Cj≡ΦÞ CASID; wf gu
R1; R2ð Þ:
Below given conditions are holds: 1) C receives the ra-
tionale {CASID, w}u encrypted with one-time random
string u; 2) C believes that all the credential components
received are recognizable 3) C entitled to trust that S1
sent message is fresh. Therefore, C verifies S1 identity
CASID if it is valid, then C believes that the S1 is legiti-
mated entity. Therefore, we can understand that C trusts
S1 and continues communication.
6) The sixth flow:
C⊲ ESKf g
C⊲ ESKf g T3ð Þ:
Whenever C receives ESK through SMS from S2, it is
entitled to believe that ESK is fresh and then decrypts it
with clients input fingerprint data and decrypted ESK
will be used for encoding clients input fingerprint data.
Therefore, we can understand that C trusts S2 and con-
tinues communication.
7) The seventh flow:
S1⊲ BB; xf gw
 
; S1; S2∋w; S2∋x; S2≡# xð Þ
S1⊲ BB; xf g T3ð Þ:
If S1 is informed by S2 that the message {BB, x}w is
encrypted with one-time random string w, then S1 ob-
tains BB and x using w. From the received message, S1
decrypted contents can be formulated as
S1j≡ΦÞ BB;wð Þ; S1; S2∋w
S1 ≡Φ BB; xf gw
 		 R1; R2ð Þ:
Below given conditions are holds: 1) S1 receives the ra-
tionale {BB, x}w i.e., encrypted with one-time random
string w; 2) S1 believes that all the decrypted credential
components are recognizable 3) S1 decrypts rationale
{BB, x}w using w; 4) S1 accepts the S2 response and con-
siders BB and x for further authentication process.
Therefore, we can understand that S1 believes S2 mes-
sage and it can be formulated as follow
S1j≡ΦÞ BB; xf gw
 
; S1; S2∋w
S1 ≡Φ BB; xf gj R1; R3ð Þ:
8) The eighth flow:
S1⊲ BB; yf gw
 
; S1; C∋w; C∋y;C≡ yð Þ
S1⊲ BB; yf gw
  T4ð Þ:
If S1 is informed by the client C that the message
{BB*, y}w is encrypted with S1 one-time random string w,
then S1 obtains BB* and y using w. From the received
message, S1 decrypted contents are formulated as
S1j≡ΦÞ BB; yð Þ; S1C∋w
S1 ≡Φ BB; yf gw
 		 R1; R2ð Þ:
If S1 private key –K is matched for decryption, then S1
accepts the client request and believes that the client’s
BB* and y are recognizable and considers for further au-
thentication process. Therefore, we can understand that
the S1 believes client request and it formulated as follow
S1j≡ΦÞ BB; yf gw
 
; S1C∋w
S1 ≡Φ BB; yf gj R1; R3ð Þ:
9) The ninth flow:
S2⊲ fingerprint status; CARSIDf gx
 
S2; S1∋x
S2⊲ fingerprint status; CARSIDf g T4ð Þ:
If S2 is informed by S1 that the message {fingerprint
status, CARSID}x is encrypted with one-time random
string x, then S2 obtains fingerprint status and CARSID
using x. From the received message, S2 decrypted con-
tents are formulated as
S2j≡ΦÞ fingerprint status; CARSIDf gS2; S1∋x
S2 ≡Φ fingerprint status; CARSIDf gxj g R1;R2ð Þ:
If S2 feels fingerprint status is recognizable and true,
then it entitled to believes that the rationale parameters
fingerprintstatus and CARSID are valid
S2j≡Φ fingerprint status; CARSIDð Þ; S2; S1Þ∋x
S2 ≡# fingerprint status; CARSIDf gx
 		 F1; F7ð Þ:
Therefore, S2 strongly believes that the parameters
received from S1 are fresh
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S2⊲  fingerprint status;CARSIDf gx
 
;
S1; S2∋x;S2j≡Φ fingerprint status;CARSIDf gð ÞÞ
S2 ≡S1∼ fingerprint status;CARSIDf gx
 		 I1ð Þ:
Below given conditions are holds: 1) S2 receives the ra-
tionale {fingerprint status, CARSID}x i.e., encrypted with
one-time random string x; 2) S2 believes that all the cre-
dential components received are recognizable 3) S2 enti-
tled to trust that S1 sent message is fresh. Then after, S2
verifies fingerprint status if it is true, then S2 believes that
the client is legitimated entity. Therefore, we can under-
stand that S2 trusts C and continues communication.
According to the proposed belief logic, S2 believes that
the server S1 is honest. We assumes S2| ≡ S1= > S1| ≡ *
and we form the following logical postulates for further
adoption
S2j≡S1¼⇒S1j≡Þ;S2j≡ fingerprint status;CARSIDf gx
 Þ;




S2 ≡S1 ≡S2↔x S1jj J2ð Þ:




C⊲ CARSIDf g T 3ð Þ
If the client C is informed by S1 that the message
{CARSID} is encrypted with S1 and C shared random
string y, then C obtains CASID using y. From the re-
ceived message, C decrypted contents are formulated as
Cj≡Φ CARSIDð ÞÞ;C; S1∋y
Cj≡Φ CASIDf gyÞ
R1;R2ð Þ:
Below given conditions are holds: 1) C receives the
rationale {CARSID}y encrypted with one-time random
string y; 2) C believes that all the credential components
received are recognizable 3) C entitled to trust that S1
sent message is fresh. Then after, C verifies S1 sent CAR-
SID if it is valid, then C believes that the CARSID is
legitimated entity. Therefore, we can understand that C
trusts cloud authorization server (CARSID) and con-
tinues authorization process for useful computations.
Experimental evaluation
The objective of this section is to report the feasibility
study of our investigated protection mechanisms. Ex-
perimental evaluation of our approach is divided into
two subsections. The first subsection describes the per-
formance and properties of the multi-factor biometric
fingerprint authentication in terms of security, time
taken for login and authentication process, etc. The
effectiveness of our protection gateway is addressed in
the second subsection in terms of time taken for data
anonymization and utility metrics. Before presenting the
performance evaluation of our proposed work, we present
the experimental setup including login, fingerprint and
bank customer databases that we used. With an extensive
analysis and experiments we show that our proposed
framework not only provides the strong authentication
and data security, but also achieves the privacy of the sen-
sitive bank account details.
Experimental setup
Setup
We implemented our mechanisms in C#.NET framework
using Visual Studio 2010, Windows Communication
Foundation (WCF) with Windows Azure Emulator and
SQL Server 2008 R1 SP1. We use a machine running with
windows 7 64-bits, 4GB RAM, 2.0GHz Intel Core i7 pro-
cessor, and a fingerprint reader. We use Elliptic Curve
Cryptosystem [53] for public-key encryption/ decryption.
Tokenization techniques described in Table 5 we used
for data obfuscation, k-anonymity generalization algo-
rithm [54] we used for generating anonymous tables.
We modify the source code of this algorithm to pre-
serve the l-diversity and t-closeness characteristics
and generated data de-identification tables.
Databases
We use four disjoint fingerprint databases (FDB’s)
which are taken from FVC2006 database [55]. The
images of each fingerprint database are captured
using four different sensors and details are given in
Table 7 with cooperation of 150 heterogeneous partici-
pants includes industrial, academic and elderly people.
Each FDB contains 150 fingers and in-depth 12 samples
per finger (i.e., 150 × 12 = 1800). Samples are of exagger-
ated distortion, dry/wet impressions and large amount of
displacement and rotations. Each FDB is divided into two
disjoint sub-databases as follow:
1. FDB1-A, FDB2-A, FDB3-A, and FDB4-A, where
each sub-database stores 140 fingerprint samples.
2. FDB1-B, FDB2-B, FDB3-B, and FDB4-B, where each
sub-database stores ten very difficult fingerprint
samples.
Table 7 Details of sensors used for capturing databases
Data sets Sensor type Resolution Image size
DS1 Optical 569 dpi 400 × 560 (224 Kpixels)
DS2 Electric Field 250 dpi 96 × 96 (9 Kpixels)
DS3 Thermal sweeping 500 dpi 400 × 560 (200 Kpixels)
DS4 SFinGe v3.0 500 dpi 288 × 384 (108 Kpixels)
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Where, B sub-databases contain the most difficult fin-
gerprint images used for evaluating protection strength
of the proposed scheme. We generated a login database
of size 150 UID’s and PWD’s, and an adult bank database
of size 450000 records using GNU-licensed open source
data generator tool [56].
Performance of our login and authentication protocol
First we compare our scheme with password-based and
other biometric authentications in terms of computa-
tional cost. Next, we illustrate the performance of our
fingerprint-based authentication mechanism.
In general, the traditional password-based authenti-
cation is more computationally effective than the
fingerprint-based authentication, because additional com-
putation power is required for validating biometric finger-
print samples. To develop the multi-factor authentication
with fingerprint biometric in a more practical way, the
fingerprint samples related computations should be ac-
curate and take less time. In [22], authors pointed out that
the practical requirements satisfaction of the biometric
fingerprint is more than other types of biometrics (e.g.,
iris, face, etc.) in terms of authentication and extraction
(e.g., fingerprint recognition included in laptop, ATM’s
etc.).
Comparisons
We took Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem [53] for public-
key encryption/decryption and it takes only one
modular multiplication for encryption. In our authen-
tication approach, each user requires one symmetric
encryption/decryption, one modular multiplication, one
exclusive-or and two hash operations in the login and au-
thentication process. Compared to the solutions described
in [27, 39, 46], our solution require only two modular ex-
ponentiations for each user. In our protocol, a new idea is
proposed where a user is allowed to select a user-id (UID)
and password, not decided by the bank server, so that the
user can memorize his/her UID and password easily. In
[27, 39, 46] authors have used timestamps for authentica-
tion. These authentications require clock synchronization
between the user and the server computers, and also the
login message transmission delay is also limited.
Our approach is used the random nonce values to
eliminate the transmission and clock synchronization
delay time. Our proposed authentication framework not
only performs the credentials validation in CAS, but also
provides the login and authentication credentials privacy.
In [27, 39, 46] checks the credentials in the smart card
and does not consider the privacy. Wenyi Liu et al. [48]
match the credentials in server and no privacy is pro-
vided. Our scheme also does not require any credentials
database at the cloud side. Table 8 provides the perform-
ance comparisons of our approach with other mechanisms.
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first
multi-factor biometric fingerprint authentication approach
which provides biometric fingerprint security and privacy
in a cloud-based environment.
Results
We evaluated our proposed authentication protocol using
series of experiments with combination of 150 UID’s and
PWD’s, and four fingerprint databases each contains 150
finger images and 12 in-depth samples per finger (i.e.,
150(UID and PWD) × 12(samples per finger) = 1800 cre-
dential records in each database). We set a time window
bound in minutes for validating user login and authentica-
tion credentials in terms of False Negative Rate (FNR) and
False Positive Rate (FPR). FNR means the rate of input
credentials matched correctly and calculated as tp/(tp + fn),
where fn is false negative and tp is true positive. FPR means
the rate of input credentials matched incorrectly and com-
puted as tn/(tn + fp), where tn is considered as true negative
and fp taken as false positive. The recognition performance
of our proposed approach for FVC2006 databases is re-
ported in Fig. 4, where x-axis indicates databases DB1,
DB2, DB3, and DB4, and y-axis indicates FNR and FPR
percentages. We have set four different time window
bounds such as 5, 10, 16 and 20 min for each database
and we find out recognition rates (Fig. 9).
We also find out the Rejection Enrollment (RE), Rejec-
tion Matching (RM), Average Enrollment Time (AET),
Average Matching Time (AMT), Equal Error Rate (EER)
and Revised EER (REER) over the FVC2006 databases as
shown in Table 9. We consider EER as a unit of measure
of fingerprint recognition performance and it denotes
where FNR and FPR are equal. The average EER of our
mechanism for the FVC2006 databases is 1.44 %. From the
Table 4 we can understand that the EER little varies for
each input fingerprint database of different sensor type.
For example, FDB4 has more equal error rate (i.e., 1.66 %)
Table 8 Performance comparison
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
A.Jyoti Choudhury et al. [46] NO NO NO NO YES
Wenyi Liu et al. [48] YES YES YES NO NO
J. K. Lee et al. [27] NO NO NO NO YES
Y.Lee and T. Kwon [39] NO NO NO NO YES
Our approach YES YES YES YES YES
C1: Requires low computation cost
C2: The user is allowed to select a user-id (UID) and password, not decided by
the bank server
C3: The clock synchronization is not required between the user and
server computers
C4: Not only performs the credentials validation in CAS, but also provides the
login and authentication credentials privacy
C5: Don’t require any credentials database at authentication server’s to
validate user identity
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when compared to FDB1 EER value (i.e., 1.15 %) because
these two databases differ in resolution and image sizes.
Our scheme generated better equal error rate than the
existing fingerprint-based works.
Security and privacy analysis
From the above comparisons and results, we show that
our MFA protocol is secured and provides the credentials
privacy from the malicious users. Here, we maintain the
anonymous credentials and access key in the highly se-
cured bank authentication server and matching is per-
formed in the cloud authentication server, so that the real
login and the authentication data are not revealed to cloud
and bank. We use the random strings and ESK for mutual
authentication of the users and servers; hence the mali-
cious users cannot pretend to be the authorized users and
impersonated requests can be eliminated.
Effectiveness of our protection gateway
The objective here is to assess the effectiveness of our priv-
acy preservation gateway using an adult customer’s data-
base of size 450000 records. Table 10 summarizes the
description of database in terms of unique number of
values, tokenization techniques and generalization hier-
archy height we used for each attribute. Here, the account
balance is considered as sensitive attribute and others are
non-sensitive. A QI of size i consists of three or more non-
sensitive attributes from the database as shown in Table 10.
We evaluate the running time taken by our proposed pro-
tection gateway to generate the k-anonymity (k = 6),
entropy l-diversity (l = 6), recursive (c, l)-diversity (4, 6)
and t-closeness (t = 0.15 & 0.2) anonymous data tables for
varied sizes of quasi-identifiers and are reported in Fig. 10.
The running times taken for generating anonymous data
tables are similar.
We quantify the utility of our protection gateway in
terms of generalization height, minimum average size of
the blocks, and discernibility. The generalization height
[57] is the metric that can be defined as the number of
generalization steps performed by an anonymization al-
gorithm while generating anonymous tables. The second
metric that implemented as a part of the anonymization
algorithm is an average size of the blocks to maintain
the anonymity among the data records. The discernibil-
ity cost metric [58] quantifies the indistinguishable data
records from each other. Figure 11 provides the utility
experimental results of our protection gateway. In Fig. 11
(i), we found that the minimum height of utility metric
is not an ideal, because it generate larger block sizes for
the tables with small height. For larger values of height
Table 9 Performance of our approach on the four fvc2006
databases
Data base EER REER RE RM AET AMT
FDB1 1.15 % 1.15 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 1.23 s 0.18 s
FDB2 1.49 % 1.49 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 1.53 s 0.19 s
FDB3 1.48 % 1.48 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 1.74 s 0.14 s
FDB4 1.66 % 1.66 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 1.76 s 0.21 s
Avg. 1.44 % 1.44 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 1.56 s 0.18
Table 10 Description of the bank customer database
Attribute Distinct values in
each domain
Tokenization technique Ht.
Name 112843 Permutation 4
Gender 2 Mixing 1
Birth date 76544 Prefix-preservation 3
Street 93724 Hashing 4
City 45665 Hashing 4
Country 41 Hashing 2
Phone no. 380543 Truncation 4
Occupation 71 Mixing 4
Account no. 450000 Hiding 4
A/c balance 35724 Shift (Sensitive Att.)
Fig. 9 Performance of our proposed multi-factor authentication
Fig. 10 Performance of proposed protection gateway
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it produces high quality of anonymizations. For the
smaller values of k, (4, l) = 2, 4, 6, 8 and t = 0.2, yields
higher utility block sizes and discernibility cost as
depicted in Fig. 11 (ii) and (iii).
Related work
Developing an efficient trusted framework for public
cloud-based environment is an open problem. In the re-
cent years efforts are being made to develop a trusted
cloud environment. We divided the existing works into
two parts. First part presents the various traditional and
cloud-based authentication works. In second part, data
security and privacy related works are addressed.
Several traditional multi-factor authentication ap-
proaches have been designed to integrate the fingerprint
biometrics with smart-card and /or password authentica-
tion. Lee et al. [27] developed a user identity verification
approach through smart cards, where the registered user
supplies his/her password and biometric fingerprint
samples in login process. In this scheme password table
is not required, but fingerprint and smart-card tables are
required for validating user’s identities. However, this
mechanism was broken by the approaches described in
[28, 29]. C. C. Chang et al. [28] reported that Lee’s au-
thentication approach cannot resist the conspiring
attack. C. H. Lin et al. [29] also discovered an improved
scheme that maps the password and fingerprint data
into a super password. However this approach cannot
resist an impersonation attack. In [38] Yoon et al. pre-
sented a solution to resist this attack. This improved
solution was broken by Lee et al. in the work done in
[39] and they made further enhancement in this scheme.
This solution is not broken till now, but it has failed to
check the server side biometrics. A multi-factor authenti-
cation privacy preserving protocol is proposed by Bhargav
et al. [40] using multi-factors namely password, a random
string and a fingerprint. In this scheme they formed a
cryptographic key by using multi-factors for identity verifi-
cation. The problem with this scheme is in authentication
phase each user needs to find expensive modular exponen-
tial computations. However, the above mentioned trad-
itional multi-factor authentication mechanisms are not
suitable for cloud-based environment and the approaches
described in [27–29, 38, 39] are also not consider the priv-
acy of the user credentials.
Some cloud-based authentication mechanisms are
developed in recent years for validating the user identities.
A.J. Choudhury et al. [46] presented an authentication
framework to integrate user ID and password with smart-
card. This scheme is not suitable for the public cloud en-
vironment, because smartcards adoption is very difficult
process and their validation process is easily compromise
to the cyber attacks. Rohitash Kumar B et al. [47] pro-
posed a MFA framework using OTP and IMEI number as
authentication secrets. In [48], Wenyi Liu et al. described
a multi-factor cloud authentication approach using user
password and secure user profile. However, the schemes
described in [47, 48] are not suitable to achieve our prob-
lems described in the sub-section 1.1. To address our
problems, the user credentials should not be revealed to
the cloud service provider, even to the enterprise, because
the fingerprint biometric data may also be used for some
other applications. Therefore, our authentication approach
protects the user credentials from cloud malicious insiders
and outsiders.
Data security and privacy remains to be top and legitim-
ate concerns for adoption of public cloud. It is an active
and challenging area for researchers to provide efficient
solutions. As a result, several data anonymization and
privacy preserving schemes are developed to ensure data
privacy and security in a public cloud. R. Chow et al. [49]
designed a scheme to build in-house cloud by avoiding ex-
ternal cloud. The advantage of this approach is to retain
the private/hybrid cloud and to eliminate the public cloud
concerns. However, this solution is not affordable and
costly for most of the organizations.
Hui Wang [50] presented a privacy-preservation solu-
tion using Ambiguity and PriView methods. The author
Fig. 11 Efficiency of our protection gateway (i) generalization height (ii) average size of blocks (iii) discernibility cost
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protected the association and presence leakages by divid-
ing the database into multiple tables using lossless joins,
but the problem with this scheme is that still there is an
association leakage and information loss, most import-
antly author has not followed proper referential integrity
constraints. K. Puttaswamy et al. [51] discovered another
alternative approach for data protection, where they
used cryptographic techniques to encrypt all the sensi-
tive data without limiting the application functionalities
in the cloud. However, this scheme is slow and the ap-
plicability is also limited, because the authors assume
that the raw data is not required for web applications,
which is a rare case.
Our protection gateway is an extension of the work
proposed by Vanessa Ayala-Rivera et al. [52], in which
data is anonymized using substitution techniques. These
techniques cannot provide high-level protection to the
sensitive data in public cloud. Therefore, their frame-
work requires advanced data obfuscation methods and
efficient privacy preservation mechanisms.
Conclusion and future work
An adoption of the online banking into cloud will provide
expertise solutions, high processing speed, reliable storage
and advanced business features at nominal cost. Data
security and privacy, residency and legal regulatory laws
remain to be top and legitimate concerns preventing the
banking organizations from adopting public cloud envir-
onment. In this article we described two practical protec-
tion mechanisms, the multi-factor biometric fingerprint
authentication and protection gateway, which enables the
banking organizations to maintain their own controls over
the customer sensitive data in a public cloud. Especially,
the user credentials and customer account details will not
be revealed to the cloud service provider and other mali-
cious users. MFA is used to verify whether the user is
authenticated or not to the online banking services.
In our approach, fingerprint data is a key factor for
authentication. We described MFA protocol using data
extraction, biometric matching, and symmetric and
asymmetric encryption/decryption algorithms. We also
analyze the completeness of our proposed authentica-
tion protocol using GNY belief logic.
Our proposed protection gateway allows the enter-
prises to protect their customer’s sensitive information
destined for the public cloud and achieves the data priv-
acy concerns. We implemented advanced tokenization
techniques and data anonymization mechanisms as inte-
gral part of the protection gateway for preserving the
privacy of the key piece of information from the inside
and outside malicious attackers. Our proposed protec-
tion mechanisms make the banking online services more
secure and reachable to a common man in cloud. In fu-
ture work, we are planning to implement query auditing
techniques for detecting and preventing the disclosures
of the sensitive information and also planning to develop
an efficient self-learning algorithm for identifying sensi-
tive data fields in the dynamic cloud datasets.
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